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Abstract
Stochastic games are a classical model in game theory in which two opponents inter-
act over a finite set of states that change stochastically over time. The central solution
concepts for these games are the discounted values and the limit value, which represent
what playing the game is worth to the players for different levels of impatience. In
the present manuscript, we provide algorithms for computing exact expressions for the
discounted values and for the limit value which, for the first time, are polynomial in
the number of states and in the number of pure stationary strategies of the players.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [23] in the 50’s as a
generalisation both of matrix games and of Markov decision processes. The game
is played by stages over a finite set of states. At each stage m ≥ 1, knowing the
current state km, the players choose actions im and jm from some finite sets. The
triplet (km, im, jm) has two effects: it produces a stage reward gm = g(km, im, jm) and
determines the law q(km, im, jm) of the state at stage m+ 1. Player 1 maximises the
expectation of the discounted sum
∑
m≥1 λ(1 − λ)
m−1gm for some discount factor λ,
whereas Player 2 minimises the same amount, so that the game is zero-sum. For zero-
sum games, the central solution concept is the value. Informally, it represents what
playing the game is worth to the players. The case where the discount factor is close to
0 is of particular importance, as it stands for the game in the long-run. Computing the
value of a stochastic game for any possible discount factor, and namely as λ vanishes,
is of capital importance in order to understand the nature of the interaction. In the
present manuscript, we propose a new method for computing the discounted values
for any fixed λ, and their limit as λ vanishes. Our algorithms are polynomial in the
number of states and in the number of pure stationary strategies of the game, that is,
strategies that depend only on the current state. This result considerably improves, in
terms of complexity cost, all existing algorithms for computing the discounted values
and their limit. In particular, it improves the best of them, due to Hansen, Koucky,
Lauritzen, Miltersen and Tsigaridas [11].
State of the art. In this seminal paper, Shapley [23] considered stochastic with
finitely many states and actions, and proved that these games have a value and that
both players have optimal stationary strategies, that is, strategies that depend only
on the current state. Let K = {1, . . . , n} be fixed throughout the paper. For each
1 ≤ k ≤ n and λ ∈ (0, 1], denote by vkλ the value of the game with initial state k and
discount factor λ. The vector of values vλ = (v
1
λ, . . . , v
n
λ) was also characterised, as the
unique fixed point of a contracting operator.
In the late 60’s, Blackwell and Ferguson [6] considered a particular stochastic game,
the so-called “Big Match”, with limiting average payoff. That is, instead of considering a
discounted average of the stage rewards, they considered the limit, as T goes to infinity,
of the Cesaro mean of the stage rewards of the first T stages. The existence of the value
for this game, and its equality to limλ→0 vλ was established, for this example. Their
result was then extended in the 70’s by Kohlberg [15] to the class of absorbing games,
that is, to stochastic games for which the state can change at most once during the
game. The convergence of the discounted values, as λ vanishes, for (general) stochastic
games was obtained by Bewley and Kohlberg [4], building on Shapley’s characterisation
of the discounted values and on Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem from semi-
algebraic geometry. The existence of the value for limit average stochastic games, and
its equality to limλ→0 vλ, was obtained by Mertens and Neyman [17]. Three alternative
proofs of the convergence of vλ as λ vanishes were established in [27, 19, 2]. In addition
to the convergence, Attia and Oliu-Barton [2] provides a new characterisation of the
discounted values and, for the first time, a characterisation for the limit values. Further
robustness results were also obtained in [18, 28, 20].
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Previous algorithms. Stochastic games thus admit a very robust solution con-
cept, the limit value, which represents what playing the game is worth in the long-run.
The problem of computing the discounted values, and their limit, have been intensively
studied. Determining whether they can be computed in polynomial time is by now
a famous open problem in computer science. Because a characterisation for the limit
value was missing until very recently, all prior algorithms were based either on decision
procedures for the first order theory of the reals, such as [8, 9, 25], or on value or
strategy iteration methods, such as [21, 7]. In terms of computation cost, all of these
algorithms are exponential both in the number of states or in the number of actions.
Moreover, Hansen, Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [10] proved that no value or strategy
iteration algorithm can ever achieve a polynomial bound. A remarkable improvement
was achieved by Hansen, Koucký, Lauritzen, Miltersen and Tsigaridas [11] using the
machinery of real-algerbaic geometry in a more indirect manner. Algorithms were ob-
tained for computing, respectively, exact expressions for the discounted values and for
their limit. While both algorithms are polynomial in the number of actions, for any
fixed number of states, the dependence on the number of states is an implicit dou-
ble exponential expression, which is problematic in terms of practical computations.
In their own words: “the exponent in the polynomial time bound is O(n)n
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, i.e., the
complexity is doubly exponential in n”, from which they claim that “getting a better
dependence on n is a very interesting open problem”.
Main results. In the present paper, we propose a new method for computing the
discounted values of a finite stochastic game, and their limit. Unlike all prior works,
our algorithms are based on the recent characterisations obtained algorithms [2]. Our
algorithms are polynomial in the number of actions, for any fixed number of states,
but the dependence on the number of states is explicit and simply exponential. Equiv-
alently, our algorithms are polynomial in the number of states and in the number of
pure stationary strategies, that is, strategies that depend only on the current state.
This improvement opens up the path for actually solving stochastic games in practice,
especially as we establish the following remarkable continuity result: for any ε > 0, we
provide an explicit λε such that |vλ − limλ→0 v
k
λ| ≤ ε for all λ ∈ (0, λε).
Organisation of the paper. Section 2 is devoted to a formal description of
stochastic games (Section 2.1), the statements of the main results of the present
manuscript (Section 2.2), and a review of some pas results on stochastic games (Sec-
tion 2.3). In Section 3 we describe algorithms for computing the discount values. Two
algorithms are given: one for computing arbitrary approximations, and another one for
computing the exact expression. In Section 4 we describe algorithms for computing,
respectively, an approximation and an exact expression for the limit values.
2 Stochastic games
Let us start by introducing finite stochastic games shortly. For a more detailed pre-
sentation of stochastic games, see [26, Chapter 5] and [22].
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2.1 Presentation
A discounted stochastic game is described by a tuple (K, (Ik), (Jk), g, q, λ, k) where:
• K = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of states, for some n ∈ N∗
• Ik and Jk are the action sets of the players at state k ∈ K
• g : Z → R is a payoff function, where Z = {(k, i, j) | k ∈ K, (i, j) ∈ Ik × Jk}
• q : Z → ∆(K) is a transition function, where for any set E we denote by ∆(E)
the set of probabilities over E
• λ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor
• 1 ≤ k ≤ n is the initial state
Outline of the game. The game proceeds as follows: at each stage m ≥ 1, both
players are informed of the current state km ∈ K. Then, independently and simultane-
ously, Player 1 chooses an action im ∈ I
km and Player 2 chooses an action jm ∈ J
km .
The pair (im, jm) is then observed by the players, from which they can infer the stage
reward g(km, im, jm). A new state km+1 is then chosen with the probability distribu-
tion q(km, im, jm), and the game proceeds to stage m + 1. At the end of the game,
Player 1 receives
∑
m≥1 λ(1− λ)
m−1g(km, im, jm) while Player 2 receives the opposite
amount.
Notation. While (K, (Ik), (Jk), g, q) will be fixed throughout the game, λ and k will
be considered as parameters. For this reason, the value of the discounted stochastic
game (K, (Ik), (Jk), g, q, λ, k) discounted value will be denoted as vkλ. We set:

I := I1 × · · · × In
J := J1 × · · · × Jn
X := ∆(I1)× · · · ×∆(In)
Y := ∆(J1)× · · · ×∆(Jn)
For any finite set E we denote its cardinality by |E|.
For any real number α, we denote by ⌈α⌉ the unique integer satisfying α ≤ ⌈α⌉ ≤ α+1
For any p ∈ N we denote its bit-size by bit(p) := ⌈log2(p + 1)⌉.
Strategies and value. A strategy is a decision rule from the set of possible obser-
vations to the set of probabilities over the set of actions. Formally a strategy for Player
1 is a sequence of mappings σ = (σm)m≥1, where σm : Z
m−1 → X. For any vector
h ∈ Zm−1 of past observations and any current state ℓ ∈ K, Player 1 chooses an action
with probability distribution σℓm(h) ∈ ∆(I
ℓ). Similarly, a strategy for Player 2 is a
sequence of mappings τ = (τm)m≥1, where τm : Z
m−1 ×K → Y . Both players choose
their strategies independently, and the sets of strategies are denoted, respectively, by
Σ and T . Together with an initial state k, a pair of strategies (σ, τ) induces a unique
probability on the sets plays ZN
∗
on the σ-algebra generated by the cylinders, denoted
by Pkσ,τ . For any (σ, τ) ∈ Σ×T , the expected payoff induced by k and (σ, τ) is denoted
by:
γkλ(σ, τ) := E
k
σ,τ
[∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
]
(2.1)
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where Ekσ,τ is the expectation with respect to P
k
σ,τ .
For any λ ∈ (0, 1] and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the value vkλ satisfies:
vkλ = sup
σ ∈Σ
inf
τ∈T
γkλ(σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
γkλ(σ, τ)
Note that, in particular, this implies:
C− := min
(ℓ,i,j)∈Z
g(ℓ, i, j) ≤ vkλ ≤ max
(ℓ,i,j)∈Z
g(ℓ, i, j) =: C+ (2.2)
Stationary strategies. A stationary strategy is one that depends on the past
observations only through the current state. A stationary strategy of Player 1, denoted
by x, is thus an element of X. Similarly, any y ∈ Y is a stationary strategy of Player 2.
The payoff induced by a pair of stationary strategies (x, y) ∈ X×Y and an initial state
k is denoted by γkλ(x, y). The sets I and J are the sets of pure stationary strategies,
for Player 1 and 2 respectively. The payoff induced by (i, j) ∈ I × J and 1 ≤ k ≤ n is
denoted by γkλ(i, j). For any ℓ ∈ K, we denote by x
ℓ ∈ ∆(Iℓ) the ℓ-th coordinate of x.
Similarly yℓ, iℓ and jℓ denote the ℓ-th coordinates of y, i and j, respectively.
2.2 Main results
Let (K, (Ik), (Jk), g, q) be a fixed stochastic game, where K = {1, . . . , n}. We will
assume in the sequel that the payoff function and the transition function take rational
values. More formally, we will assume the following.
Assumption: There exists N ∈ N∗ such that, for all 1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ′ ≤ n and (i, j) ∈ Iℓ×Jℓ
one has:
g(ℓ, i, j), q(ℓ′ | ℓ, i, j) ∈
{
0,
1
N
,
2
N
, . . . , 1
}
(2.3)
We will refer to this assumption as (HN ), where N is the integer appearing in (2.3).
We can now state the main results of the present paper, namely, a new algorithm for
computing the discounted values, a new algorithm for computing the limit value, and
a continuity result. Our two algorithms considerably improve all previously known
algorithms in terms of computation cost. To measure this cost, we will use the loga-
rithmic cost model, which assigns a cost to every arithmetic operation proportional to
the number of bits involved.
Result 1. There exists an algorithm that takes as input a stochastic game satisfying
(HN ) and a discount factor satisfying λ = m/N for somem ∈ N
∗, and outputs an exact
expression for vkλ. The algorithm is polynomial in n, |I|, |J | and the bit-size of N .
Result 2. There exists an algorithm that takes as input a stochastic game satisfying
(HN ) and outputs an exact expression for limλ→0 v
k
λ. The algorithm is polynomial in
n, |I|, |J | and the bit-size of N .
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N.B. The algorithms mentioned in Results 1 and 2 will be provided, together with
algorithms for computing arbitrary approximations for vkλ and limλ→0 v
k
λ.
The following continuity result, very useful in practice, is a building stone in going
from Result 1 to Result 2.
Result 3. For any r ∈ N, let λr := 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)r. Then:∣∣∣∣vkλ − limλ→0 vkλ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12r , ∀λ ∈ (0, λr]
N.B. The expression of λr is convenient, as it is relatively simple and, more impor-
tantly, its bit-size is polynomial in n, |I|, bit(N) and r. An alternative, and tighter,
expression would be as follows: λr = 2
−cr where d := min(|I|, |J |) and
cr := dn(bit(n) + 2bit(N)) + dbit(d) + 2bit(dn+ 1) + rnd+ 1
2.3 Selected past results
The aim of this section is to present a selection of past results that will be used in the
sequel. Let us start by recalling the main results from Shapley [23].
Theorem 1. For any λ ∈ (0, 1] and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the game (K, (Ik), (Jk), g, q, λ, k)
has a value vkλ, which satisfies:
vkλ = sup
σ ∈Σ
inf
τ∈T
γkλ(σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
γkλ(σ, τ)
= max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
γkλ(x, y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
γkλ(x, y)
Theorem 2. For any λ ∈ (0, 1], the vector vλ = (v
1
λ, . . . , v
n
λ) is the unique fixed
point of the operator Φλ : R
n → Rn, where for each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n and u ∈ Rn, Φℓλ(u) is
the value of the following |Iℓ| × |Jℓ| matrix game:(
λg(ℓ, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑n
ℓ=1
q(ℓ′ | ℓ, i, j)uℓ
′
)
(i,j)∈Iℓ×Jℓ
From now one, let 1 ≤ k ≤ n be some fixed initial state. Let us now present character-
isations of vkλ and limλ→0 v
k
λ that were obtained in [2], . In order to state these results,
we recall the definition of the parameterised matrix games introduced therein.
The parameterised matrix games. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n be a fixed initial state.
Consider the game induced by a pair (i, j) ∈ I × J of pure stationary strategies: every
time that the state 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n is reached, the players play (iℓ, jℓ) ∈ Iℓ × Jℓ, so that
the stage reward is g(ℓ, iℓ, jℓ) and the law of the next state is given by q(ℓ, iℓ, jℓ). In
other words, the state variable follows a Markov chain with transition matrix Q(i, j) ∈
R
n×n and the rewards can be described by a vector g(i, j) ∈ Rn. For any λ ∈ (0, 1],
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let γλ(i, j) := (γ
1
λ(i, j), . . . γ
n
λ (i, j)) ∈ R
n be the vector of expected payoffs in the λ-
discounted game, as the initial state varies from 1 to n. By stationarity, Q(i, j), g(i, j)
and γλ(i, j) satisfy:
γλ(i, j) = λg(i, j) + (1− λ)Q(i, j)γλ(i, j) (2.4)
Therefore, by Cramer’s rule one has:
γkλ(i, j) =
dkλ(i, j)
d0λ(i, j)
(2.5)
where d0λ(i, j) := det(Id−(1−λ)Q(i, j)) 6= 0 and where d
k
λ(i, j) is the determinant of the
n × n-matrix obtained by replacing the k-th column of Id−(1− λ)Q(i, j) with g(i, j).
Linearising the quotient in (2.5) gives the desired parameterised matrix game.
Definition 2.1 For any z ∈ R, define the |I| × |J | matrix W kλ (z) by setting:
W kλ (z)[i, j] := d
k
λ(i, j)− zd
0
λ(i, j), ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J (2.6)
The value of W kλ (z) is denoted by valW
k
λ (z).
The following two results were obtained in [2].
Theorem 3. For any λ ∈ (0, 1], vkλ is the unique solution to:
z ∈ R, valW kλ (z) = 0
Theorem 4. As λ vanishes, vkλ converges to the unique solution of:
wk ∈ R,
{
z > wk ⇒ F k(z) < 0
z < wk ⇒ F k(z) > 0
where for any z ∈ R, F k(z) := lim
λ→0
λ−n valW kλ (z) ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
Remark 2.2 For any λ ∈ (0, 1], the mapping z 7→ valW kλ (z) is strictly decreasing and
continuous, and z 7→ F k(z) is strictly decreasing. See [2, Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3].
The following two results can be found in [1]. In the first, will use the following
notation: for any p × p-matrix M , we denote by S(M) the sum of the entries of the
co-factor matrix of M , with the convention S(M) := 1 if p = 1. For the second, recall
that a real number α is algebraic of degree p if there exists a polynomial P with integer
coefficients satisfying P (α) = 0, and p is the lowest degree of all such polynomials.
Theorem 5. There exists a square sub-matrix of W kλ (z), denoted by W˙
k
λ (z), for
which the following relations hold:
valW
k
λ (z) = R(λ, z) :=
det W˙ k
λ
(z)
S(W˙ k
λ
(z))
R(λ, vkλ) = 0
Moreover, R 6≡ 0 and, among the finitely many possible non-zero rational fractions
defined in this way, there exists one satisfying R(λ, vkλ) = 0 for all λ sufficiently small.
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Theorem 6. Suppose that g and q take rational values. Then, for each rational
λ, the value of (K, I, J, g, q, λ, k) is algebraic of degree at most d := min(|I|, |J |), and
limλ→0 v
k
λ is algebraic of degree at most d.
3 Computing the discounted values
Throughout this section, (K, I, J, g, q, λ, k) will denote a stochastic game with n states
satisfying (HN ) and such that Nλ ∈ N.
The aim of this section is to establish Result 1. To do so, we will proceed in three
steps. First, we will obtain some explicit bounds on the defining polynomial of the
algebraic number vkλ, that is, the unique polynomial P (z) = a0+a1z+ · · ·+apz
p which
satisfies P (vkλ) = 0, a0, . . . , ap ∈ Z, ap > 0 and gcd(a0, . . . , ap) = 1. These bounds will
be obtained combining some results from Basu, Pollack and Coste-Roy [3], together
with Theorems 5 and 6.
Second, we will recall a well-known result from Kannan, Lenstra and Lovasz [13],
which states that an exact expressions of an algebraic number can be obtained in
polynomial time from a sufficiently close approximation of this number and from a
bound on the coefficients and the degree of its defining polynomial. Third, we will
describe a binary search algorithm, directly derived from Theorem 3, for computing
an 2−r-approximation of vkλ for all r ∈ N, and prove that this algorithm is polynomial
in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r. By combining these three steps will yield the desired result.
We will start by the third step, mainly for two reasons. First, because for any fixed
λ, obtaining arbitrary approximations for vkλ is enough in practice. Second, because in
view of Result 3, obtaining arbitrary approximations of vkλ, for arbitrarily small λ, is
the key for obtaining not an exact expression for vkλ but also for the limit limλ→0 v
k
λ.
3.1 Compute an approximation
The following simple binary-search algorithm provides an arbitrary ε-approximation
of vkλ according to Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 approx
Input: An integer N ∈ N∗, a finite stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k) with n states
satisfying (HN ) and λN ∈ N, and a precision level r ∈ N
Output: An integer u ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2r} such that vkλ ∈ [u2
−r, (u+ 1)2−r]
1. Set w := 0, w := 1
2. WHILE w − w > 2−r DO:
2.1 z := w+w2
2.2 Compute W kλ (z)
2.3 Compute v := valW kλ (z)
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2.4 IF v ≥ 0, THEN w := z
2.5 IF v ≤ 0 THEN w := z
3. RETURN u := 2rw
Computation cost of Algorithm 1 approx. In order to measure the efficiency
of an algorithm we will use the so-called logarithmic cost model, which assigns a cost to
every arithmetic operation proportional to the number of bits involved. To determine
(a bound for) the logarithmic cost of an algorithm it is thus sufficient to bound the num-
ber of arithmetic operations that it requires, and the bit-sizes of the numbers involved.
To illustrate this notion, let us start by the simplest case: the multiplication of two in-
tegers p and q requires one operation with numbers of bit-size bit(pq) ≤ bit(p)+ bit(q).
Next, consider the (less-obvious) case of the computation of the determinant of an
n× n matrix with entries of bit-size C. The number of operations, and thus the cost,
depends on the algorithm that is used: while the use of the minor expansion formula
requires O(n!) operations, the LU decomposition requires only O(n3). Concerning
the bit-size of the numbers involved, in both cases one can use Hadamard’s inequal-
ity to obtain the bound n(C+bit(n)) (see, for instance, Basu et al. [3, Algorithm 8.16]).
Let us go back to Algorithm 1 approx. By Theorem 3, at each iteration of
Step 2 one has w ≤ vkλ ≤ w and the length of the interval [w,w] is reduced by a factor
of 1/2. Consequently, the algorithm terminates after at most r steps. As Steps 2.1,
2.4 and 2.5 require one operation each, the computation cost of the algorithm depends
essentially on the computation cost of Steps 2.2 and 2.3, which is the object of the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Set L := 2nbit(N2) + nbit(n) + r + 1. Then:
(i) For all (i, j) ∈ I × J and z satisfying bit(z) ≤ 2r one has bit(W kλ (z)[i, j]) ≤ L
(ii) Step 2.2 requires O(n3|I||J |) arithmetic operations, with numbers of bit-size L.
(iii) Step 2.3 requires O(|I|5|J |L) operations, with numbers of bit-size O(|I||J |L).
Proof. (i) Fix (i, j) ∈ I×J . By definitionW kλ (z)[i, j] = d
0
λ(i, j)−zd
0
λ(i, j) where d
0
λ(i, j)
and d0λ(i, j) are determinants of some n × n matrices which, because of Assumption
(HN ) and because λN ∈ N, have entries in the set {m/N
2 | − N2 ≤ m ≤ N2}.
Therefore, these two numbers are rational. Clearly, their denominator is bounded by
N2n and the numerator is the determinant of an n×nmatrix with integer entries in the
set {−N2, . . . , N2}. By Hadamard’s inequality, the latter is bounded by nn/2N2n and,
consequently, its bit-size is bounded by nbit(n) + nbit(N2). To conclude, one needs to
add two operations, namely the multiplication zd0λ(i, j) and the sum d
k
λ(i, j)− zd
0
λ(i, j).
Using the easy inequalities bit(p + q) ≤ max(bit(p), bit(q)) + 1 and bit(pq) ≤ bit(p) +
bit(q), which hold for any p, q ∈ R, one obtains, for any z satisfying bit(z) ≤ 2r:
bit(W kλ (z)[i, j]) ≤ max
(
bit(dkλ(i, j)), bit(zd
0
λ(i, j)
)
+ 1
≤ 2r + nbit(n) + nbit(N2) + 1
= L
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(ii) According to Basu et al. [3, Algorithm 8.16]), the Dogdson-Jordan-Bareiss algo-
rithm computes the determinant of an n × n matrix with integer entries in the set
{−m, . . . ,m} in O(n3) operations and the bit-size of the numbers involved during the
algorithm is bounded by nbit(m) + nbit(n). Hence, the numerators of the rational
numbers d0λ(i, j) and d
k
λ(i, j) can be computed in O(n
3) operations involving numbers
of bit-size nbit(N2)+nbit(n). The two additional operations required in the definition
of W kλ (z)[i, j], the fact that all z appearing in the algorithm satisfy bit(z) ≤ 2r and the
fact that W kλ (z) is a |I| × |J |-matrix, give the desired result.
(iii) Computing the value of a p × q matrix game M = (mij) is equivalent to solving
a linear program with p variables and p + q constraints, namely maxw1 + · · · + wp
subject to wi ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p, and m1jw
1 + · · · +mpjw
p ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ q.
Let bit(M) denote the bit-size of the matrix M , that is, the number of bits required to
store it. By Karmarkar [14], solving a linear program with p variables and constraints
described by M requires O(p4bit(M)) operations involving numbers of bit-size bit(M).
By (i), the bit-size of the matrix W kλ (z) is bounded by |I||J |L so that valW
k
λ (z) can
be computed in O(|I|5|J |L) operations, with numbers of bit-size |I||J |L, which gives
the desired result.
Remark 3.2 We have implicitly assumed that Step 2.2 uses the Dogdson-Jordan-
Bareiss algorithm to compute W kλ (z), and that Step 2.3 uses Karmarkar interior-point
method for computing valW kλ (z), as these algorithms are well-known and polynomial.
From Lemma 3.1, one easily deduces the complexity cost of Algorithm 1 approx.
Theorem 3.3 For any r ∈ N, Algorithm 1 approx provides a 2−r-approximation
of vkλ, and its computation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r.
Remark 3.4 Note that |I| and |J | are the sets of pure stationary strategies of the
game, and that these sets are exponential in nature. If, for instance, Player 1 has m
actions at every state, then |I| = mn, whereas the number of actions is mn. In other
words, Theorem 3.3 does not state that one can solve stochastic games in polynomial
time.
3.2 Bounds on the defining polynomial of vkλ
By Theorem 6, the algebraic degree of vkλ is bounded by |I|. The aim of this section
is to bound the coefficients of its defining polynomial. Let us start by the following
result, borrowed from Basu, Pollack and Coste-Roy [3, Proposition 8.12].
Lemma 3.5 Let A be an p × p-matrix with polynomial entries in the variables
Y1, . . . , Yℓ of degrees bounded by q and integer coefficients of bit-size at most ν. Then
detA, considered as a polynomial in Y1, . . . , Yℓ has degrees in Y1, . . . , Yℓ bounded by pq,
and coefficients of bit-size at most pν + pbit(p) + ℓbit(pq + 1).
We can prove the following result.
Proposition 3.6 Let C := 8|I|2n2bit(N). Then, all coefficients of the defining poly-
nomial of vkλ have bit-size of at most C.
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Proof. Let (i, j) ∈ I × J be fixed. Consider now W kλ (z)[i, j] = d
k
λ(i, j)− zd
0
λ(i, j) as a
polynomial in λ and z. By construction, dkλ(i, j) and d
0
λ(i, j) are the determinants of two
n×nmatrices whose entries are polynomial in λ of degree at most one, and have rational
coefficients in the set {m/N | −N ≤ m ≤ N}. Therefore, Nndkλ(i, j) and N
ndkλ(i, j) are
integers. By Hadamard’s inequality, they are bounded by Nnnn/2. Hence, each entry
of NnW kλ (z) is a polynomial in λ and z, of degree n and 1 respectively, and coefficients
of bit-size ν := bit(nn/2Nn). Let W˙ kλ (z) denote a square sub-matrix of W
k
λ (z), and let:
P (λ, z) := det(NnW˙ kλ (z))
Clearly, the size of the sub-matrix W˙ kλ (z) is bounded by |I| and P (λ, z) is a polynomial
with integer coefficients in λ and z. Applying Lemma 3.5, it follows that P (λ, z) is of
degree at most |I|n in λ and z, and the bit-size of its coefficients is bounded by:
|I|ν + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1)
Recall that, by assumption, one has λN ∈ N. Because the degree of λ in P (λ, z) is
bounded by n|I|, the polynomial Pλ(z) := N
n|I|P (λ, z) is now a polynomial in the
variable z only, with integer coefficients of bit-size:
|I|ν + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) + bit(Nn|I|)
Using the bounds bit(ba) ≤ abit(b) and bit(a) ≤ a (for any a, b ∈ N∗), it follows that
ν ≤ nbit(n) + nbit(N), bit(Nn|I|) ≤ n|I|bit(N) and the bit-size of each coefficients of
Pλ(z) can be bounded by:
|I|nbit(n) + |I|nbit(N) + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) + n|I|bit(N) ≤
|I|n2 + |I|nbit(N) + |I|2 + 2|I|n + 2 + n|I|bit(N)
which is clearly bounded by 8|I|2n2bit(N). Note that this bound holds for all polyno-
mials which are defined as the determinant of some square sub-matrix of W kλ (z). By
Theorem 5, one of them is a multiple of the defining polynomial of vkλ, so that the
bounds that we have obtained hold for the defining polynomial of vkλ.
Remark 3.7 In the proof of Proposition 3.1 we have established the following useful
result. Let W˙ kλ (z) be a square sub-matrix of W
k
λ (z), and let P (λ, z) := det(N
nW˙ kλ (z)).
Then P (λ, z) is a polynomial in λ and z with integer coefficients, degree at most |I|n
in λ and z, and coefficients of bit-size:
f(|I|, n,N) := |I|nbit(n) + |I|nbit(N) + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) (3.1)
3.3 Exact computation of vkλ
The aim of this section is to present a well-known result from Kannan, Lenstra and
Lovasz [13], and to derive from it an algorithm to compute an exact expression for vkλ.
For any algebraic number α of order p, its height as h(α) := max(|a0|, . . . , |ap|) where
P (z) = a0 + a1z + · · ·+ apz
p is its defining polynomial.
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Theorem 3.8 (Kannan, Lenstra and Lovasz) There exists an algorithm that out-
puts an algebraic number α ∈ R when given as inputs q, C and α¯ satisfying:
• q is a bound on the algebraic degree of α
• 2C is a bound for h(α), the height of α
• |α− α¯| ≤ 12s12q where s = s(q, C) := ⌈q
2 + (3q + 4) log2(q + 1) + 2qC⌉.
The algorithm, denoted as Algorithm KLL, runs in time polynomial in q and C.
We can now present our algorithm.
Algorithm 1 exact
Input: An integer N ∈ N∗ and a finite stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, λ, k) with n
states, satisfying (HN ) and λN ∈ N.
Output: An exact expression for vkλ
1. Initialisation phase
1.1 Set C = 8|I|2n2bit(N)
1.2 Set s := ⌈|I|2 + (3|I| + 4) log2(|I|+ 1) + 2|I|C⌉
1.3 Set r := s⌈log2 12|I|⌉
2. Run Algorithm 1 approx with inputs (K, I, J, g, q, λ, k) and the precision level r,
and output u
3. Run Algorithm KLL with inputs |I|, C and u/2r, and output v
4. RETURN v.
We can now state Result 1 precisely.
Theorem 3.9 Algorithm 1 exact computes an exact expression for vkλ. Its compu-
tation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J | and bit(N).
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, Step 2 of the algorithm returns an integer u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2r}
satisfying |u2−r − vkλ| ≤ 2
−r, and the computation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |,
bit(N) and r. By the choice of r, Step 3 provides an exact expression for the algebraic
number vkλ, and the computation cost is polynomial in |I| and C, by Theorem 3.8.
Indeed, |I| and C are bounds, respectively, for the algebraic degree of vkλ and for the
bit-size of the coefficients of its defining polynomial by Theorem 6 and Proposition
3.6. The result follows from the fact that C and r are polynomial in n, |I| and bit(N),
which is straightforward: on the one hand, the definitions of C and r imply r = O(s|I|)
and C = O(|I|2n2bit(N)) and, on the other:
s ≤ |I|2 + (3|I|+ 4)(|I| + 1) + 2|I|C + 1 = O(|I|3n2bit(N))
Therefore, r = O(|I|4n2bit(N)), and this estimate completes the proof.
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4 Computing the limit value
The aim of this section is to provide an algorithm for computing an exact expression
for the limit value of a stochastic game, that is, limλ→0 v
k
λ. As for the discounted values
vkλ, we will start by providing a simple binary search method, based on Theorem 4,
to compute arbitrary approximations of this limit. This method is then superseded by
simpler algorithm, which relies on Result 3, established below. Next, we show that
the coefficients of the defining polynomial of the limit value are bounded by the same
expression that was obtained in Proposition 3.6. Together, the algorithm for obtaining
arbitrary approximations of the limit value and the bounds on its algebraic degree and
the bit-size of the coefficients in its defining polynomial yield, thanks to the algorithm
from Kannan, Lenstra and Lovasz [13], to the desired algorithm.
4.1 Computing an approximation
Let us start by a remarkable technical result, which will have many consequences in the
sequel, such as Result 3. Roughly speaking, the result establishes, for any r ∈ N∗, an
auxiliary discount factor λr ∈ (0, 1] such that the game W
k
λr
(z) contains all the useful
information that one needs to known about F k(z) := limλ→0 λ
−n
valW kλ (z), and for
any z ∈ {0, 12r , . . . ,
2r
2r }.
Proposition 4.1 For any r ∈ N∗, let Zr := {0,
1
2r , . . . ,
2r
2r } and λr := 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)r.
Then, valW kλr(z) and F
k(z) are of same sign for all z ∈ Zr. More precisely:

valW kλr(z) > 0 =⇒ F
k(z) ∈ [0,+∞]
valW kλr(z) < 0 =⇒ F
k(z) ∈ [−∞, 0]
valW kλr(z) = 0 =⇒ F
k(z) = 0
Proof. By Theorem 5, there exists a finite set of rational fractions E such that, for
each (λ, z) ∈ (0, 1]×R, there exists R ∈ E such that valW kλ (z) = R(λ, z). Let P (λ, z)
and Q(λ, z) indicate the polynomials corresponding to the numerator and denominator
of R(λ, z). They belong, respectively, to two finite sets of bi-variate polynomials,
denoted by En and Ed. By Remark 3.7, all polynomials in En are of degree at most
n|I| in λ and z; moreover, they can be assumed to have integer coefficients of bit-size
at most f(|I|, n,N) . Take now some fixed z ∈ Zr. Clearly, 2
rz ∈ N, so that for all
P ∈ En, the following expression:
Pz(λ) := 2
rn|I|P (λ, z)
defines a polynomial in the variable λ with integer coefficients of bit-size bounded by
f(|I|, n,N) + rn|I|. Let En(z) be the set of all the polynomials obtained this way, as
P ranges over En, and similarly let Ed(z) denote the set of the finitely many possible
polynomials for the denominator of Rz(λ) = Pz(λ)/Qz(λ).Then, by Theorem 5, for
any λ ∈ (0, 1] there exists Pz ∈ En(z) and Qz ∈ En(z) such that:
valW kλ (z) =
Pz(λ)
Qz(λ)
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In particular, a necessary condition for the function λ 7→ valW kλ (z) to change of sign
at some α ∈ R is that Pz(α) = 0 for some polynomial Pz ∈ En(z). Yet, for each
polynomial with integer coefficients p(t) = a0+ · · ·+ aqt
ℓ, any real root α of p satisfies
either α = 0 or |α| > 12‖p‖∞ , where ‖p‖∞ := max(|a0|, . . . , |ap|). Applying this bound
to the polynomials in En(z), it follows that neither of these polynomials admits a root
in the interval (0, 2−cr ], unless it is an identically 0 polynomial, where:
cr := f(|I|, n,N) + rn|I|+ 1 ∈ N
Consequently, the sign of λ 7→ valW kλ (z) is constant in (0, 2
−cr ]. If, for instance,
valW kλr(z) > 0, then λ
−nW kλ (z) > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, 2
−cr ] so that:
F k(z) := lim
λ→0
λ−nvalW kλ (z) ∈ [0,+∞]
Similarly, valW kλr(z) < 0 implies F
k(z) ∈ [−∞, 0] in the same manner, and
valW k2−cr (z) = 0 implies F
k(z) = 0. The result follows then from the relation
0 < λr < 2
−cr , which can be easily obtained as follows:
cr = |I|nbit(n) + |I|nbit(N) + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) + rn|I|+ 1
≤ |I|n2 + |I|nbit(N) + |I|2 + 2|I|n + 2 + rn|I|+ 1
≤ 10|I|2n2bit(N)r
Remark 4.2 In Proposition 4.1, the expression for λr can be replaced by any λ satis-
fying λ ∈ (0,≤ 2−cr ], where
cr = |I|nbit(n) + |I|nbit(N) + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) + rn|I|+ 1
The choice of setting λr = 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)r is motivated by the simplicity of this expres-
sion, and the fact that its bit-size admits an obvious polynomial expression.
Proposition 4.1 suggests the following binary search algorithm.
Algorithm 2 approx
Input: An integer N ∈ N∗, a finite stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k) with n states
satisfying (HN ), and a precision level r ∈ N
Output: An integer u ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2r} such that limλ→0 v
k
λ ∈ [u2
−r, (u+ 1)2−r]
1.1. Set λr := 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)r
1.2. Set w := 0, w := 1
2. WHILE w − w > 2−r DO:
2.1 z := w+w2
2.2 Compute W kλr(z)
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2.3 Compute v := valW kλr(z)
2.4 IF v ≥ 0, THEN w := z
2.5 IF v ≤ 0 THEN w := z
3. RETURN u := 2rw
Indeed, the natural way to go from Theorem 4 to obtain a binary search algorithm
would be to compute F k(z) at each step. However, not only this computation might
be very costly, it is also not necessary in view of Proposition 4.1. After all, one only
needs the sign of F k(z), and this can be obtained by computing the sign of valW kλr(z),
a considerably easier task. In fact, Proposition 4.1 implies Result 3, from which one
can obtain a much simpler algorithm for computing arbitrary approximation of the
limit value.
Theorem 4.3 For any r ∈ N, let λr := 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)r. Then:∣∣∣vkλ − limλ→0 vkλ∣∣∣ ≤ 12r ∀λ ∈ (0, λr ]
Proof. Let λ ∈ (0, λr] be fixed throughout the proof. First of all, recall that the maps
z 7→ valW kλ (z) and z 7→ F
k(z) are strictly decreasing, as already noted in Remark 2.2.
Therefore, either there exists some z ∈ Zr = {0,
1
2r , . . . ,
2r
2r } satisfying valW
k
λ (z) = 0, or
there exists 0 ≤ m ≤ 2r such that valW kλ (m2
−r) > 0 and valW kλ ((m+1)2
−r) > 0, and
the same is true for F k. Consider the first case, and let z satisfy valW kλ (z) = 0. Then,
Theorem 3 implies vkλ = z, so that, by Proposition 4.1 (see also Remark 4.2) one has
F k(z) = 0. But then limλ→0 v
k
λ = z by Theorem 4. Hence, |v
k
λ−limλ→0 v
k
λ| = 0 in this
case. Consider now the second case, and let 1 ≤ m ≤ 2r be such that valW kλ (m2
−r) > 0
and valW kλ ((m + 1)2
−r) > 0. On the one hand, by Theorem 3, these inequalities
imply:
m2−r < vkλ < (m+ 1)2
−r
On the other, by Proposition 4.1 one has that F k(m2−r) ≥ 0 and F k((m+1)2−r) ≤ 0
which, in view of Theorem 4 and the monotonicity of the map z 7→ F k(z), implies:
m2−r ≤ limλ→0 v
k
λ ≤ (m+ 1)2
−r
The result follows.
Remark 4.4 As already noted in Remark 4.2, the choice of λr was motivated by the
simplicity of its expression, but one can replace λr with 2
−cr in Theorem 4.3 as well.
Theorem 4.3 simplifies things considerably. In order to obtain a 2−r-approximation
of limλ→0 v
k
λ, it is enough to compute a 2
−(r+1)-approximation of vkλr+1 . We can thus
provide an improvement of Algorithm 2 approx.
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Algorithm 2 approx fast
Input: An integer N ∈ N∗, a finite stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k) with n states
satisfying (HN ), and a precision level r ∈ N
Output: An integer u ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2r+1} such that | limλ→0 v
k
λ − u/2
r+1| ≤ 2−r
1. Set λr+1 := 2
−10|I|2n2bit(N)(r+1)
2. Run Algorithm 1 approx with inputs (K, I, J, g, q, λr+1 , k) and precision level
r + 1, and output u
3. RETURN u
The following statement provides a bound on the complexity cost of Algorithm
2 approx fast.
Theorem 4.5 For any r ∈ N, Algorithm 2 approx fast provides a 2−r-approximations
of limλ→0 v
k
λ. Its computation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r.
Proof. Let Nr+1 := N/λr+1 ∈ N
∗. Because Nr+1 is a multiple of N , the stochastic
game (K, I, J, g, q, k) satisfies (HNr+1) as well. Indeed, it is enough to multiply the
numerator and the denominator of each g(ℓ, i, j) and q(ℓ′ | ℓ, i, j) by 1/λr+1 ∈ N
∗.
Hence, by Theorem 3.3, the cost of computing a 2−(r+1)-approximation of vkλr+1 with
Algorithm 1 approx is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(Nr+1) and r + 1. Yet:
bit(Nr+1) ≤ bit(N) + 10|I|
2n2bit(N)(r + 1)
so that bit(Nr+1) is a polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r. Hence, the computation
cost of Algorithm 2 approx fast is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r. It
remains to show that its output u is a 2−r-approximation of the limit value. On the
one hand, u is obtained at Step 2 using Algorithm 1 approx, so that it satisfies
|u2−(r+1) − vkλr+1 | ≤ 2
−(r+1) by Theorem 3.3. On the other hand, by Theorem 4.3 one
has | limλ→0 v
k
λ − v
k
λr+1
| ≤ 2−(r+1). Therefore:
∣∣∣limλ→0 vkλ − u2−(r+1)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣limλ→0 vkλ − vkλr+1
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣u2−(r+1)∣∣∣ ≤ 2−(r+1) + 2−(r+1) = 2−r
which proves the desired result.
4.2 Exact computation of the limit value
The aim of this section is to provide an algorithm which inputs a finite stochastic games
and outputs an exact expression for its limit value, which is an algebraic number of
order at most |I| by Theorem 6. Like for the discounted values, going from an
approximation of limit value to an exact expression for it requires explicit bounds for
the coefficients of its defining polynomial. Let us start by this result.
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Proposition 4.6 Let C := 8|I|2n2bit(N). Then, all coefficients of the defining poly-
nomial of wk := limλ→0 v
k
λ have bit-size of at most C.
Proof. From Theorem 5, for some non-zero bi-variate polynomial P (λ, z) of degree
at most n|I| in λ and z, and which belongs to an explicit finite set of polynomials, one
has P (λ, vkλ) = 0 for all λ sufficiently small. Moreover, this polynomial can be assumed
to have integer coefficients whose bit-size is bounded by C, see Proposition 3.6 and
Remark 3.7. Let P0, . . . , Pn|I| be the unique polynomials in z satisfying:
P (λ, z) = P0 + λP1(z) + · · ·+ λ
n|I|Pn|I|(z) = 0
Clearly, there for some 0 ≤ s ≤ |I| and some non-zero polynomial Ps one has:
P (λ, z) = λsPs(z) + o(λ
s), as λ→ 0
By construction, Ps is of degree at most n|I| and its coefficients are integers of bit-
size at most C. Dividing by λ and taking it to 0, one obtains, by the continuity of
polynomials:
0 = lim
λ→0
P (λ, vkλ)
λs
= Ps(w
k)
The equality Ps(w
k) = 0 implies then that Ps is a multiple of the defining polynomial
of wk, which gives the desired result.
We can now describe an algorithm, very similar to Algorithm 1 exact, to obtain
an exact expression for the limit value.
Algorithm 2 exact
Input: An integer N ∈ N∗ and a finite stochastic game (K, I, J, g, q, k) with n states,
satisfying (HN )
Output: An exact expression for limλ→0 v
k
λ
1. Initialisation phase
1.1 Set C = 8|I|2n2bit(N)
1.2 Set s := ⌈|I|2 + (3|I| + 4) log2(|I|+ 1) + 2|I|C⌉
1.3 Set r := s⌈log2 12|I|⌉
2. Run Algorithm 2 approx fast with inputs (K, I, J, g, q, k) and precision level
r + 1, and output u.
3. Run Algorithm KLL with inputs |I|, C and u/2r+1, and output v
4. RETURN v.
We now establish a bound for the complexity cost of Algorithm 2 exact, along
the same lines of the analogue result, Theorem 3.9.
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Theorem 4.7 Algorithm 2 exact computes an exact expression for limλ→0 v
k
λ. Its
computation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J | and bit(N).
Proof. By Theorem 4.5, Step 2 returns an integer u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2r+1} such that∣∣∣u2−(r+1) − limλ→0 vkλ∣∣∣ ≤ 2−r
and the computation cost is polynomial in n, |I|, |J |, bit(N) and r. By the choice
of r, Step 3 provides an exact expression for the algebraic number limλ→0 v
k
λ and the
computation cost is polynomial in |I| and C, by Theorem 3.8. Indeed, |I| and C
are bounds, respectively, for the algebraic degree of limλ→0 v
k
λ and for the bit-size of
the coefficients of its defining polynomial by Theorem 6 and Proposition 4.6. The
result follows from the fact that C and r are polynomial in n, |I| and bit(N), which
is straightforward: on the one hand, the definitions of C and r imply r = O(s|I|) and
C = O(|I|2n2bit(N)) and, on the other:
s ≤ |I|2 + (3|I|+ 4)(|I| + 1) + 2|I|C + 1 = O(|I|3n2bit(N))
Therefore, r = O(|I|4n2bit(N)), and this estimate completes the proof.
4.3 An example
We end this section with an example intended to help the reader visualize the important
auxiliary matrices W kλ (z). The game goes back to Kohlberg [5]. It is played over 4
states, where states 3 and 4 are absorbing with payoffs 1 and −1 respectively, i.e. once
these states are reached, the stage payoffs remain constant ever after. The situation in
states 1 and 2 is described as follows:
1 →
→ ↓
−1 ←
← ↓
1 −1
Arrows indicate deterministic transitions to the state pointed by them, and a stage
payoff of 0, whereas the absence of an arrow indicates that the state remains the same
and the stage payoff is the number indicated in that case. The parameterised matrix
game corresponding to state 1 is given by:
W 1λ (z) = λ
2


λ2(1− z) λ(1− z) −λ(1− λ)− λz −(2λ− λ2)z
λ(1− z) λ(1− z) −(2λ− λ2)z −(1− λ)2 − z
−λ(1− λ)− λz −(2λ− λ2)z λ(1 − z)− λz 1− λ− z
−(2λ− λ2)z −(1− λ)2 − z 1− λ− z 1− λ− z


In this example, one has n = 4, |I| = 4 and N = bit(N) = 1. To compute a 2−r-
approximation of limλ→0 v
1
λ it is enough to compute v
1
λr
for λr = 2
−cr , where:
cr = |I|nbit(n) + |I|nbit(N) + |I|bit(|I|) + 2bit(|I|n + 1) + rn|I|+ 1
In our case, this estimates gives λr = 2
−(67+16r). The desired approximation can thus
be obtained by performing Algorithm 1 approx with discount factor λr+1.
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